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JUDICIAL CENTRALIZATION.
Mr. Justice Brewer, in a recent address, says regarding legisla-
tive centralization :-"Local self-control is giving way before the
pressure for centralized power. The town meeting is supplanted
by the state legislature, while the latter in its turn is yielding to the
expanding power of Congress. Political parties are largely under
the management of bosses, and the whole great forces of industry,
business and politics seem passing under the dominance of single
central control. Is this centralizing tendency antagonistic or helpful
to the Republic? Is it consistent with popular government? Ap-
parently it is antagonistic; against the Republican thought of equal-
ity of right; each man a ruler and equally sharing the responsibili-
ties and powers of government. * * * * You cannot stay this
movement towards consolidation and centralization. It is a natural
evolution."
Judge Brewer's address suggests the inquiry whether this move-
ment towards centralization has extended to the Judicial Depart-
ment of the government also.
The judicial reports furnish evidence that centralization is fur-
ther advanced in the judicial than in the legislative department; that
not only are judicial powers being centralized in the Federal courts
by being withdrawn from the State courts, but also that these cen-
tralized powers are being centered in the Federal judges by being
withdrawn from the juries.
I. Two of the amendments added to the Constitution of the
United States soon after its adoption were intended to better secure
the right of trial by jury, both in criminal and civil cases.
Violation of that right in a criminal case -constituted one of the
charges upon which an associate justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States was impeached in 18o4. The articles of impeach-
ment charged that Mr. Justice Chase:-
"Did, in his judicial capacity, conduct himself in a manner highly
arbitrary, oppressive and unjust * * * in debarring the pris-
oner from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury
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(through his counsel) on the law, as well as on the fact, which was
to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same time endeavor-
ing to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument,
and determine the question of law, as well as the question of fact,
involved in the verdict which they were required to give. * * *
In consequence of which irregular conduct, as dangerous to our
liberties as it is novel to our laws and usages, the said John Fries
was deprived of the right secured to him by the eighth article
-amendatory of the Constitution, and was condemned to death with-
out having been heard by counsel in his defence, to the disgrace of
the character of the American bench, in manifest violation of law
and justice, and in open contempt of the rights of juries, on which
ultimately rest the liberty and safety of the American people."
To that charge, the venerable and learned judge pleaded not
guilty; and, in his answer, admitted that "the jury had a right to
determine the law as well as the fact," and declared, "this power he
holds to be a sacred part of our legal privileges, which he never has
attempted, and never will attempt, to abridge or obstruct." Annals
of Congress, 1804-18o5, pp. 86-115. Upon that plea, Judge Chase
was tried and acquitted.
Notwithstanding this concurrence of opinion in 18o4, that it was
the "indisputable right" of the jury under the Constitution to deter-
mine the law as well as the fact in criminal cases, and that it consti-
tuted a high crime and misdemeanor in a judge to attempt to wrest
that right from them, it was declared by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1894, that, "In the courts of the United States it is
the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court
and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evi-
dence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law,
upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to
the facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be." 156
U. S. 51.
Mr. Justice Gray, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Shiras, dis-
sented, and said :--"Until nearly forty years after the adoption of
the Constitution of the United States, not a single decision of the
highest court of any State, or of any judge of a court of the United
States, has been found, denying the right of the jury upon the gen-
eral issue in a criminal case to decide, according to their own judg-
ment and conscience, the law involved in that issue--except the two
or three cases, above mentioned, concerning the constitutionality of
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a statute. * * * The question what are the rights, in this re-
spect, of persons accused of crime, and of juries summoned and em-
paneled to try them, under the Constitution of the United States,
is not a question to be decided according to what the court may
think would be the wisest and best system to be established by the
people or by the legislature, but what, in the light of previous law,
and of contemporaneous or early construction of the Constitution,
the people did affirm and establish by that instrument. * * *
As the experience of history shows, it cannot be assumed that judges
will always be just and impartial, and free from the inclination, to
which even the most upright and learned magistrates have been
known to yield-from the most patriotic motives, and with the most
honest intent to promote symmetry and accuracy in the law-of
amplifying their own jurisdiction and powers at the expense of
those entrusted by the Constitution to other bodies."
The effect of that decision is not only to withdraw from the jury
to the court the right to determine the law in criminal cases, but also
to make the court the final judge of its own powers, and to with-
draw from those upon whom the Constitution has conferred "the sole
power of impeachment," and "the sole power to try all impeach-
ments" to the judicial department the power to determine what con-
stitutes an impeachable offence in a judge.
As it is only in the High Court of Impeachment that judges can
be called to give an account of the manner in which they have dis-
charged their official duties, the judicial department, no more than
the legislative or executive departments, could by mere force of its
own decision, finally determine the limitations upon its own powers,
without putting it into the power of every judge to exempt himself
from all responsibility to his country for his official acts, by merely
pleading, in justification, that he, as the court, had decided that he,
as the judge, had a lawful right to do the act which the House of
Representatives, acting as the Grand Inquest of the nation, had pre-
sented as a high crime and misdemeanor in the High Court of Im-
peachment, the highest tribunal of the nation.
II. By overruling its prior decisions, the Supreme Court has
vastly enlarged the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
To secure the right of trial by jury under the law of the land
against the encroachments of the admiralty courts, it was declared
by an Act of Parliament, in 1389, that the admiralty must "not med-
dle henceforth of anything done within the realm, but only of a thing
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-done upon the sea." Two years after, to remove any doubts as to
what was meant by the realm and the sea, came another Act of Par-
liament ordering that of "things done within the bodies of coun-
tries, by land or water, the admirals shall have no cognizance, but
they shall be tried by the law of the land."
In 1768: John Adams prepared for the citizens of Boston instruc-
tions to their representatives in which it was said "that next to the
revenue itself the late extensions of the jurisdiction of the admiralty
are our greatest grievance. The American courts of admiralty
seem to be forming by degrees into a system that is to overrun our
Constitution and to deprive us of our best inheritance, the laws of
the land." And the American colbnies, in their address to the King,
-complained that "the powers of the admiralty and vice-admiralty
courts are extended beyond their ancient limits; whereby our prop-
erty is taken from us withotit our consent."
For more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution,
it was uniformly held by the Supreme Court that the constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the Federal judiciary was limited
by what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England, when the
Constitution was adopted. During all that period, the established
doctrine in England that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to
tide water, and did not extend into the body of a county, although
the tide might ebb and flow there, was recognized by the Supreme
Court as furnishing the test for determining the general admiralty
jurisdiction of the Federal courts. io Wheat. 428 (1825) ; 7 Pet.
.324; II Pet. 175; 12 Pet. 76 (1838).
But in 1847, the Court concluded that "the grant of admiralty
powers to the courts of the United States was not intended to be
limited by what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England
-when the Constitution was adopted ;" discovered "a surer foundation
for a correct ascertainment of the locality of marine jurisdiction in
the general admiralty law, than in the designation of it by the com-
-mon law courts in England;" and held that "the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the United States extends to tide waters, as far
-as the tide flows, though that be infra corpus comitatus." 5 How.
441. Ten years later, the Court held that the general admiralty ju-
risdiction extended into the body of a county, although there was no
-tide there. 20 How. 296. And it is now held generally that the
general admiralty jurisdiction extends over all navigable waters
throughout the Union, whether with or without tide, and whether
-within or without the body of a county.
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The effect of this enlargement of jurisdiction is :-(i), the abo-
lition of the trial by jury over large tracts of country; (2), the sub-
stitution there of the civil law and its forms for the common law
and 'the statutes of the States; and, (3), the enroachment on the ju-
risdiction of the tribunalg of the State over disputes happening be-
tween its own citizens. 5 How. 441; 2o How. 296.
III. Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury in suits at common law, probably no lawyer could now be found,
either upon the bench, or at the bar, who would, upon consideration,
deny that the equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts has silently
encroached upon the common law jurisdiction of those courts, and
substituted trial by the chancellor under the principles of equity, as
administered by the Federal courts, for trial by jury under the law
and statutes of the states; or that the extraordinary remedies of
equity have become ordinary remedies.
Mr. Justice Miller has called attention, in a dissenting opinion,
to one phase of this encroachment :-"The creation of receiverships
by courts of chancery, the powers conferred on the receivers, and
the duration of their office, has made a progress which, since it is
wholly the work of courts and not of legislatures, may well suggest
a pause for consideration. Of the many thousand miles of railway
in my judicial circuit, and of the fifty or more corporations who own
or have owned them, I think I speak within limits in saying that
hardly half a dozen have escaped the hands of the receiver. If
these receivers had been appoinied to sell the road, collect its means
and pay its debts, it might have been well enough. But this was
hardly ever done. It is never done now. It is not the purpose for
which a receiver is appointed. He, generally, takes the road and all
its appurtenances out of the hands of the company which is its own-
er; operates the road in his own way, with an occasional suggestion
from the court, which he recognizes as a sort of partner in the busi-
ness; sometimes, though very rarely, pays some money on the debt
of the corporation, but quite as often adds to the sum of these debts,
and injures the prior creditors by creating a new and superior lien
on the property pledged to them. All this time the receiver, in the
use of the company's road and rolling stock, is performing the func-
tion of a common carrier of goods and passengers. He makes con-
tracts and incurs obligations, many of which he fails to perform.
The decision which has just been announced declares that for these
failures he cannot be sued in a court of law. * * * The right
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of trial by jury, which has been-regarded as secured to every man
by the Constitutions of the States and of the United Sfates, is denied
to the-person injured, and he is compelled, though his cause be one
with no-element of equitable jurisdiction in it, to submit it to a court
of chancery or to one of the masters of such a court." 1o4 U. S. 126.
IV. But it is on the law side of the Federal courts, that the
strongest evidence is found of their expanding powers. The con-
test there was not one for jurisdiction between common law, equity
and admiralty courts, or between Federal and State courts. There
it was the last struggle for the preservation of the right of local self-
government, a futile effort to beat back the encroachments of what
has come to be known as "general law," and the "common law of the
United States," upon the common law of the several States.
The question as to the existence of a common law of the United
States seems to have been particularly noticed for the first time judi-
cially by Mr. Justice Chase, on the circuit, in 1798. He said :--"In
my opinion, the United States, as a Federal government, have no
common law. If, indeed, the United States can be supposed for a
moment, to have a common law, it must, I presume, be that of Eng-
land; and, yet, it is impossible to trace when, or how, the system
was adopted, or introduced. * * * The United States must
possess the common law themselves before they can communicate
it to their judicial agents. Now, the United States did not bring it
with them from England; the Constitution does not create it; and
no act of Congress has assumed it. Besides, what is the common
law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it
exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the States; and
of the various modifications, which are we to select, the system of
Georgia or New Hampshire, of Pennsylvania or Connecticut?"
2 Dall. 384.
In 1834 and in 185o the Supreme Court declared :--"It is clear
there can be no common law of the United States. The federal
government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent
States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and com-
mon law. There is no principle which pervades the Union and has
the authority of law that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws
of the Union. The common law could be made a part of our federal
system only by legislative adoption. When, therefore, a common
law right is asserted, we must look to the State in which the contro-
versy originated." 8 Pet. 658; 2 Pet. 144.
YALE LA W.OURNAL.
"The common law, in all its diversities, has not been adopted by
any one of the States. In some of them it has been modified by
statutes, in others by usage. And, from this it appears that what
may be the common law of one State is not necessarily the common
law of any other. We must ascertain the common law of each State
by its general policy, the usages sanctioned by its courts, and its
statutes." 9 How. 78.
That constitutional principle and rule of decision was laid down
without limitation, qualification or exception; but, except as to real
estate, the rule has been virtually abrogated by gradually grafting
upon it limitations, qualifications and exceptions.
Formerly the rule was applied in determining the rights and lia-
bilities of parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, the class
of cases first withdrawn from its operation.
"The Constitution declares that no State shall impair the obli-
gations of a contract, and there is no other limitation on State power
in regard to contracts. In determining on the nature and effect of
a contract, we look to the lex loci where it was made or where it was
to be performed. And bills of exchange, foreign or domestic, con-
stitute, it would seem, no exception to this rule. Some of the States
have adopted the law merchant, others have not. The time within
which a demand must be made on a bill, a protest entered, and notice
given, and the damages to be recovered, vary with the usages and
legal enactment of the different States. These laws in various form
and in numerous cases, have been sanctioned by this court. Indors-
ers on a protested bill are held responsible for damages, under the
law of the State where the indorsement was made. Every indorse-
ment on a bill is a new contract, governed by the local law." 8 How.
82; I Cr. 181; I Cr. 291; 3 Cr. 312; 5 Cr. 49; 5 Cr. 142; 5 Cr. 322;
6 Cr. 204; 9 Wheat. 581; 2 Pet. 331 ; 4 Pet. 366; 4 How. 326.
Subsequently the court laid down and applied the rule of deci-
sion thus .---"The questions under our consideration are questions
of general commercial law. * * * Whatever respect, therefore,
the decisions of State tribunals may have on such a subject, and they
certainly are entitled to great respect, they cannot conclude the judg-
ment of this court." 16 Pet. 5Ix (1842).
"Where private rights are to be determined by the application of
common law rules alone, this court, although entertaining for State
tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound by their decisions."
2 Black, 418 (1862).
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"The single question presented for our determination is, whether
the engineer and fireman of this locomotive, running alone and with-
out any train attached, were fellow servants of the company, so as
to preclude the latter from recovering from the company for injuries
by the negligence of the former. This is not a question of local law
to be determined by an examination of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, the State in which the cause of action arose, and in
which the suit was brought, but rather one of general law to be de-
termined by a reference to all the authorities, and a consideration of
the principles underlying the relation of master and servant. * *
* It is a question in which the nation as a whole is interested."
149 U. S. 370, (1892).
In order to prove the existence of a body of "general law," Mr.
Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the Court, cited many
cases upon many subjects, all of comparatively recent date, which
had been decided by the Supreme Court under the "general law,"
in direct opposition to the law of the State in which the cause of ac-
tion arose, and the case was tried, as that law had been declared by
'the courts of that State.
Mr. Justice Field dissented, and said :--"Is the Federal judicial
department to force upon these States views of the common law
which their courts and people have repudiated? I cannot assent to
the doctrine that there is an atmosphere of general law floating
about all the states, not belonging to any of them, and of which the
Federal judges are the special possessors and guardians, to be ap-
plied by them to control judicial decisions of the State courts, when-
evei they are in conflict with what those judges consider ought to be
law. The present case presents some singular facts. The verdict
and the judgment of the court below were in conformity with the
law of Ohio, in which State the cause of action arose and the case
was tried, and this court reverses the judgment because rendered
in accordance with that law, and holds it to have been error that it
was not rendered according to some other law than that of Ohio,
which it terms the general law of the country. This court thus as-
sumes the right to disregard what the judicial authorities of that
State declare to be its law, and to enforce upon the State some other
conclusion as law which it has never accepted as such, but always
repudiated. * * * I am aware that what has been termed the
general law of the country-which is often little less than what the
judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general
law on a particular subject-has been often advanced in judicial
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opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a State. I ad-
mit that learned, judges have fallen into the habit of repeating these
doctrines as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a State
in conflict with their views. * * * But, notwithstanding the
great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and not-
withstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiter-
ated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the
Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves
the autonomy and independence of the States-independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments.
And according to Mr. Justice Miller, there was a like change in
regard to the binding force in the Supreme Court of the decisions
of State courts upon the construction of State constitutions and State
statutes :-"I think I have sustained by this examination of the cases,
the assertion made in the commencement of this opinion that the
court has, in this case, taken a step in advance of anything thereto-
fore decided by it on this subject. That advance is in the direction
of a usurpation of the right, which belongs to the State courts, to de-
cide as a finality upon the construction of State constitutions and
State statutes. This invasion is made in a case where there is no
pretense that the Constitution, as thus construed, is any infraction
of the laws or Constitution of the United States." i Wall. 175.
"It is an entire and unqualified overthrow of the rule imposed
by Congress and uniformly acted on by this court up to the year
1863, that the decisions of the State courts must govern this court
in the construction of State statutes." 8 Wall. 575.
In its last utterance on the subject of a common law of the United
States, the court referred to a collection of extracts from its opinion
as "all tending to show the recognition of a general common law
existing throughout the United States, not, it is true, as a body of
law distinct from the common law enforced in the States, but as con-
taining the rules and principles by which all transactions are con-
trolled, except so far as those rights and principles are set aside by
express statute." i8i U. S. 163 (I9OI).
As the court enlarged the'admiralty jurisdiction by the adoption
of the "general" admiralty law, so it has enlarged, or created, other
powers by adopting the "general law."
The court has overthrown in fact what it had previously estab-
lished in principle. During the first half-century of its organiza-
tion there was no constitutional principle more firmly established
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by its decision than that "there can be no common law of the United
States ;" "there is no principle which pervades the Union and has
the authority of law that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws
of the Union;" "we must ascertain the common law of each State by
its general policy, the usages sanctioned by its courts and its stat-
utes." Without controverting or refuting the correctness of that
principle, the court has ejected, subject by subject, the common law
of the several states from the Federal tribunals, and substituted the
"general law." Thus has the Supreme Court come to be the real
maker of the laws administered in the Federal tribunals, even in de-
termining rights which, admittedly, are not, under the Constitution,
subject to regulation by the legislative, much less the judicial, de-
partment of the Federal Government.
Marshall, when a representative in Congress, declared that "it
was the duty of each department to resist the encroachments of the
others," and expressed the apprehension that "the other departments
would be swallowed up by the judiciary." While Chief Justice he
asked concerning the Constitution -- "To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing,
if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and
unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the per-
sons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts al-
lowed, are of equal obligation." I Cr. 176.
Across the intervening years, the answer is echoed back by Mr.
Justice Gray :--"As the experience of history shows it cannot be
assumed that judges will always be free from the inclination, to
which even the most upright and learned magistrates have been
known to yield-from the most patriotic motives and with the most
honest intent to promote symmetry and accuracy in the law-of am-
plifying their own jurisdiction and powers at the expense of those
entrusted by the Constitution to other bodies." 156 U. S. 176.
These are some of the evidences to be found in the reports of
that centralization which is transforming this Government from one
of laws into one of men. Whether that change be approved, or dis-
approved, or accepted as "natural evolution," the manner in which
the change has been wrought is a symptom of waning respect for
law, and especially for what was formerly declared by the court of
last resort to be the fundamental principles upon which this Govern-
ment was founded.
L. H. Pool.
